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Introduction	
There	are	many	reasons	to	get	water	prices	right.	Increasing	water	scarcity	and	climate	change	
now	need	to	be	added	to	the	list.	Climate	change	in	particular	presents	water	and	wastewater	
utilities	with	a	complex	new	set	of	management	and	strategic	challenges.	One	important	way	for	
water	utilities	to	deal	with	the	uncertainty	introduced	by	climate	change	is	to	maintain	cash	
reserves	that	can	be	deployed	to	address	problems	as	they	arise.	But	few	water	utilities	
generate	sufficient	cash	to	cover	their	full	costs,	and	typically	are	unable	to	invest	to	protect	
strategic	capital	assets	from	extreme	events	or	to	build	new	capital	facilities	to	address	changes	
in	rainfall	and	streamflow	variability.		
It	is	thus	increasingly	important	for	water	utilities	to	adopt	financially	and	economically	sound	
water	tariff	designs	that	enable	them	to	reliably	provide	essential	services	to	their	customers.		
This	requires	that	water	utilities	have	access	to	the	expertise	to	understand	how	tariff	reforms	
will	affect	water	use,	revenues,	and	capital	investment	needs,	and	how	these	in	turn	affect	the	
multiple	criteria	that	are	used	to	assess	the	performance	of	water	tariffs.	This	capability	to	
carefully	model	the	full	array	of	consequences	of	a	tariff	reform	process	is	currently	not	well	
developed	in	either	water	utilities	themselves	or	in	the	community	of	consultants	who	support	
them.	
In	this	paper	we	build	upon	and	modify	a	simulation	model	first	used	by	Whittington	et	al.	
(2015)	to	assess	how	subsidies	are	distributed	across	households	under	an	existing	increasing	
block	tariff	(IBT)	structure.	In	this	paper	we	expand	upon	our	prior	analysis	to	examine	the	
consequences	of	a	change	from	an	existing	uniform	volumetric	price	(UP)	tariff	structure	to	an	
IBT,	and	to	estimate	how	this	tariff	reform	would	affect	three	objectives:	equity,	economic	
efficiency,	and	cost	recovery.	Our	purpose	is	to	develop	a	better	understanding	of	the	trade‐offs	
between	these	three	objectives	for	different	water	tariffs.	It	is	widely	recognized	that	the	design	
of	municipal	water	tariffs	requires	balancing	multiple	objectives	such	as	financial	self‐
sufficiency	for	the	service	provider,	equity	(especially	for	poor	households),	and	economic	
efficiency	for	society.	However,	the	actual	trade‐offs	between	these	competing	objectives	are	
rarely	quantified	for	policy	makers.	As	a	result	policy	makers	typically	do	not	have	a	clear	
picture	of	the	choices	they	face.	They	are	thus	forced	to	rely	on	their	intuition	to	judge	these	
trade‐offs.		
As	in	Whittington	et	al.	(2015),	we	rely	on	hypothetical	(simulated)	data	for	a	population	of	
5000	households,	and	assume	that	water	use	and	income	across	the	population	can	be	best	
represented	by	log‐normal	distribution	functions.	We	use	simulated	data	instead	of	real	data	for	
three	reasons.	First,	household	data	sets	that	combine	accurate	information	on	household	water	
use	and	monthly	water	bills	with	information	on	household	income	are	rare	(Whittington	et	al.,	
2015).	Second,	the	large	number	of	datasets	and	studies	on	residential	water	demand	around	
the	world,	as	well	as	numerous	income	studies,	provide	sufficient	information	to	calibrate	
distributions	of	water	use	and	income	among	a	hypothetical	population	of	households	
connected	to	the	piped	water	distribution	system.	Third,	simulated	data	allow	us	to	study	a	
range	of	IBTs	designs	and	to	check	how	their	performance	in	terms	of	equity	and	economic	
efficiency	is	affected	by	characteristics	of	the	IBT,	including	the	size	of	i)	a	positive,	fixed	charge,	
ii)	the	first	(lifeline)	block,	and	iii)	the	price	in	different	blocks.	
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We	do	not	claim	to	identify	a	tariff	structure	that	finds	the	optimal	balance	between	the	three	
objectives	that	are	the	focus	of	this	paper	(cost	recovery,	equity,	and	economic	efficiency).1	
Rather	we	analyze	how	the	shift	from	a	UP	tariff	to	different	IBTs	designs	affects	households’	
water	use	and	water	bills,	and	how	these	changes	in	turn	affect	measures	of	equity	and	
economic	efficiency	for	different	cost	recovery	constraints.		
The	analysis	of	a	shift	from	a	UP	tariff	to	an	IBT	necessitated	making	assumptions	about	how	
households	would	respond	to	changes	in	prices	(i.e.,	households’	price	elasticity	of	demand),	
which	is	an	important	difference	compared	to	the	analysis	in	Whittington	et	al.	(2015).	We	also	
make	assumptions	about	the	costs	of	services,	household	income,	and	household	water	use	that	
are	similar	to	many	cities	in	industrialized	countries.	Our	analysis	is	also	applicable	to	cities	in	
developing	countries	where	households	have	metered,	piped	connections,	but	assumptions	
about	the	magnitude	of	some	parameters	such	as	household	income	and	costs	of	services	would	
need	to	be	adjusted	to	more	closely	reflect	local	conditions.	
We	model	a	shift	to	an	IBT	because	IBTs	are	currently	the	most	popular	tariff	structure	used	by	
water	and	wastewater	utilities	globally.2	A	common	argument	in	favor	of	IBTs	is	that	charging	
large	water	users	a	higher	volumetric	price	(in	higher	blocks)	allows	utilities	to	provide	a	
minimum	quantity	of	water	to	some	households	at	a	reduced	volumetric	price	in	the	lower,	
“lifeline”	block.	Households	that	benefit	most	from	this	reduced	volumetric	price	use	small	
amounts	of	water,	and	are	commonly	thought	to	be	the	poorest.	However,	for	this	cross‐
subsidization	from	the	rich	to	poor	households	to	happen,	two	conditions	are	necessary.		First,	
low‐income	households	should	consume	less	water	than	high‐income	households.	Second,	the	
volumetric	price	that	is	charged	in	the	higher	blocks	should	be	above	average	cost.	If	all	the	
volumetric	prices	in	the	IBT	structure	(from	the	lowest	to	the	highest	block)	are	below	average	
cost,	then	all	units	of	water,	whether	sold	to	small	or	large	users,	will	be	subsidized.	As	a	
consequence,	those	who	consume	more	water	will	receive	more	subsidies,	a	situation	that	is	
inconsistent	with	the	objective	of	targeting	subsidies	to	the	poor.		
It	is	thus	surprising	to	observe	the	widespread	use	of	IBTs	by	utilities	in	cities	where	these	two	
conditions	are	not	likely	to	be	met.	The	idea	that	households	with	low	water	use	are	poor	and	
large	users	are	rich	has	been	challenged	for	a	number	of	years,	starting	with	Boland	and	
Whittington	(2000).	Recent	empirical	evidence	on	the	correlation	between	water	use	and	
income	indicates	that	the	correlation	is	positive	but	small	(Whittington	et	al.,	2015),	which	is	
consistent	with	findings	that	the	income	elasticity	of	residential	water	use	is	positive	but	small.3	
As	far	as	the	level	of	price	is	concerned,	utilities	(even	in	industrialized	countries)	are	rarely	
covering	their	full	costs	and	water	is	often	subsidized,	even	in	the	higher	blocks	(Reynaud,	
2016).	
We	argue	that	a	water	tariff	structure	(e.g.	an	IBT)	performs	better	in	terms	of	equity	if	it	
delivers	a	larger	share	of	total	subsidies	to	the	poor,	which	we	define	in	our	calculations	as	
households	falling	in	the	first	quintile	of	the	income	distribution.	Because	IBTs	involve	a	
distortion	from	efficient	pricing	(which	is	achieved	in	the	reference	scenario	based	on	a	UP	tariff	
structure),	we	present	the	trade‐off	between	equity	and	economic	efficiency,	the	latter	
                                                            
1	Other	authors	(e.g.	Szabo,	2015)	have	attempted	to	derive	an	“optimal”	tariff	from	the	perspective	of	the	
single	criterion	of	economic	efficiency.	Such	derivations	typically	depend	on	a	similar	set	of	(often	
implicit)	assumptions	as	discussed	in	this	paper. 
2	Among	165	water	utilities	surveyed	by	Global	Water	Intelligence	in	71	low‐	and	middle‐income	
countries	in	2013,	74%	were	using	IBTs	(Whittington	et	al.,	2015).	
3	Estimates	of	income	elasticity	of	residential	water	demand	are	often	in	the	range	0.1‐0.3	(Nauges	and	
Whittington,	2010;	Grafton	et	al.,	2011). 
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measured	by	the	deadweight	loss	that	results	from	the	implementation	of	the	IBT.4,	5	Finally,	the	
financial	cost	recovery	objective	is	taken	into	account	through	two	constraints	imposed	in	our	
simulation	model:	100%	cost	recovery	and	50%	cost	recovery.	We	ignore	other	objectives	that	
water	utilities	may	consider	in	the	design	of	water	tariffs,	such	as	revenue	stability	and	water	
conservation.		
We	find	that	IBTs	perform	poorly	in	terms	of	targeting	subsidies	to	low‐income	households	
regardless	of	the	magnitude	of	financial	subsidies	that	a	utility	receives	from	high‐level	
government.	We	also	show	that	when	cost	recovery	is	low,	the	distribution	of	subsidies	under	
IBTs	is	even	worse	if	the	correlation	between	water	use	and	household	income	is	high.	IBTs	
introduce	price	distortions	that	induce	economic	efficiency	losses,	but	we	show	that	these	
welfare	losses	are	relatively	small,	especially	when	households	respond	to	average	price.	
This	study	adds	to	the	empirical	literature	on	subsidy	targeting	in	the	water	sector.	A	number	of	
authors	have	investigated	how	IBTs	perform	in	terms	of	distributing	subsidies	to	the	poorest	
households	but	fewer	have	considered	the	trade‐off	between	redistribution	and	economic	
efficiency.	Borenstein	(2012)	asks	similar	questions	for	the	residential	electricity	sector.	He	
explores	trade‐offs	between	wealth	transfer	and	economic	efficiency	using	household	billing	
data	provided	by	three	large	Californian	electric	utilities	combined	with	block‐level	income	data	
provided	by	the	United	States	Census	Bureau,	and	finds	that	IBT	tariffs	for	electricity	do	
redistribute	income	from	wealthier	to	poorer	households	but	that	transfers	are	fairly	modest	in	
comparison	to	substantial	losses	in	economic	efficiency.	
	
2.	Background	
Policy	makers	and	water	professionals	often	rely	too	heavily	on	their	intuition	to	assess	how	
changes	in	water	tariff	regimes	affect	financial	self‐sufficiency,	equity,	and	economic	efficiency.	
Quantitative	assessment	of	these	impacts	requires	the	specification	of	a	set	of	nonlinear	
relationships	with	numerous	parameters,	and	then	formal	simulation	procedures	to	analyze	
how	changes	in	the	tariff	structure	and	price	levels	affect	outcomes	of	policy	interest.	Intuition	
is	an	unreliable	guide	for	understanding	the	behavior	of	systems	of	nonlinear	equations.	
Policy	makers	often	make	implicit	assumptions	about	both	the	parameters	in	this	system	of	
nonlinear	equations	and	the	functional	relationships	themselves.	Three	parameters	in	this	
system	of	nonlinear	equations	have	received	insufficient	attention;	they	stand	out	as	both	
                                                            
4	We	follow	the	approach	of	Borenstein	(2012).	
5 “Deadweight	loss”	is	the	monetary	measure	of	the	loss	in	economic	efficiency	that	results	from	the	
change	from	a	UP	to	an	IBT	structure,	taking	into	account	impact	on	residential	water	users,	the	owners	
of	the	water	utility	(taxpayers	if	the	utility	is	publicly	owned),	and	taxpayers.	A	household’s	consumer	
surplus	under	a	specific	tariff	is	the	difference	between	the	household’s	willingness	to	pay	(WTP)	for	
piped	water	services	and	its	bill.	Total	consumers’	surplus	is	the	summation	of	each	household’s	surplus	
over	the	entire	population	(Total	WTP	–	Total	bills).	The	economic	rents	to	the	utility	owners	are	always	
zero	in	our	simulations	because	any	shortfall	in	revenues	is	covered	by	taxpayers,	and	the	utility’s	
revenues	never	exceed	its	costs	(by	assumption).	Taxpayers	cover	the	shortfall	in	utility’s	revenues.	This	
shortfall	is	zero	under	the	assumption	of	100%	cost	recovery	and	is	strictly	positive	under	the	
assumption	of	50%	cost	recovery	(equal	to	Total	costs	–	Total	bills).	When	moving	from	a	UP	tariff	to	an	
IBT	structure,	a	household’s	consumer	surplus	increases	[decreases]	if	the	average	price	decreases	
[increases].	The	total	change	in	households’	consumer	surplus	is	calculated	by	summing	over	the	change	
in	surplus	experienced	by	all	households.	The	change	in	taxpayers’	surplus	is	calculated	by	the	change	in	
the	amount	of	subsidies	they	pay	to	the	utility	to	cover	the	shortfall	in	revenues. 
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important	to	the	outcomes	of	a	tariff	reform	process	and	often	uncertain	in	a	particular	local	
setting.	
2.1.	Correlation	between	household	income	and	water	use	
The	first	is	the	correlation	between	household	water	use	and	income.	Water	professionals	
typically	assume	that	the	correlation	between	household	income	and	water	use	is	high,	i.e.,	that	
rich	households	use	more	water	than	poor	households.	There	is,	however,	surprisingly	little	
empirical	evidence	reported	in	the	literature	to	support	this	assumption.	To	address	this	gap,	
we	gathered	household	surveys	from	both	developed	and	developing	countries,	and	estimated	
the	correlation	between	income	and	water	use	(measured	here	by	the	Spearman’s	  ).	We	do	
not	argue	that	this	is	a	representative	sample	of	households	in	either	developed	or	developing	
countries,	but	in	the	absence	of	more	comprehensive	analyses,	we	suggest	that	it	is	likely	to	be	
illustrative.		
We	combined	data	from	several	sources	(see	Table	1).	Evidence	from	industrialized	countries	
mainly	comes	from	the	2008	OECD	Environmental	Policy	and	Individual	Behaviour	Change	
(EPIC)	survey,	which	includes	eight	OECD	countries	(Australia,	Canada,	France,	Italy,	South	
Korea,	Netherlands,	Norway,	and	Sweden).6	About	1000	households	were	interviewed	in	each	
country	about	their	environmental	behavior	and	attitudes	in	different	sectors	(water,	energy,	
waste,	food,	and	personal	transport)	and	their	household	income.	For	a	subset	of	households	in	
each	country,	the	survey	collected	data	on	the	household’s	annual	water	bill	and	annual	water	
use.7	In	addition,	we	had	access	to	water	use	and	income	information	for	a	sample	of	2240	
households	from	13	Portuguese	municipalities.8	Whittington	et	al.	(2015)	provide	a	description	
of	the	survey	data	covering	the	cities	in	four	developing	countries	(Sri	Lanka,	El	Salvador,	
Senegal,	and	Kenya)	in	Table	1.	
Table	2	presents	the	mean	and	median	household	monthly	water	use	(in	m3)	and	the	mean	
household	income	(in	US$	per	month)	for	each	of	the	eight	countries	covered	by	the	OECD	
survey.	Median	household	monthly	water	use	varies	from	8	m3	in	France	to	18	m3	in	Korea.	
Mean	monthly	income	varies	from	a	low	of	US$3051	in	Korea	to	US$7199	in	Norway.	
Table	1	shows	the	correlation	between	household	income	and	water	use	in	the	surveys	we	
analyzed.		In	four	of	the	thirteen	country	data	sets,	the	correlation	was	not	statistically	
significant.	For	the	remaining	nine	data	sets	the	correlation	was	statistically	significant	and	
positive;	it	varied	between	+0.1	and	+0.3.	The	correlation	between	household	water	use	and	
income	is	thus	typically	(but	not	always)	positive,	but	quite	low.	This	means	that	there	are	many	
rich	households	that	use	small	amounts	of	water,	and	many	poor	households	that	use	large	
quantities	of	water.9	
                                                            
6 For	more	details	on	the	EPIC	surveys	and	related	publications,	see	OECD	(2011)	and	
http://www.oecd.org/env/consumption‐innovation/households.htm	(accessed,	5	October	2016).	
7	These	variables	are	missing	for	a	large	number	of	households,	for	different	reasons:	either	these	
households	were	not	charged	for	water	based	on	their	consumption	and	did	not	receive	a	bill;	or	water	
charges	were	included	in	their	rent	and	did	not	appear	as	a	separate	item;	or	they	were	not	able	(or	not	
willing)	to	look	for	bills	when	answering	the	questionnaire.	For	more	details	on	the	water‐specific	data	in	
the	OECD	survey,	see	OECD	(2011)	and	Grafton	et	al.	(2011).	
8	The	database	includes	both	primary	data	obtained	from	households	(including	income)	and	their	actual	
monthly	water	use	and	billing	data	provided	by	utilities	over	the	period	July	2011‐June	2012	(for	more	
details,	see	Correia	et	al.,	2015).	
9 The	low	correlation	between	household	income	and	water	use	could	also	be	explained	by	differences	in	
household	size	between	low‐income	and	high‐income	households.	Low‐income	households	may	have	a	
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2.2.	Relationship	between	marginal	and	average	cost	
Efficient	water	pricing	requires	that	households	face	a	price	that	reflects	the	opportunity	costs	
that	their	incremental	use	imposes	on	the	water	utility	(and	society),	i.e.	the	full	social	marginal	
cost.	However,	water	utilities	often	do	not	know	the	relationship	between	their	average	and	
marginal	costs.	Textbook	expositions	of	natural	monopolies	present	marginal	costs	below	
average	costs,	with	increases	in	output	that	result	in	falling	marginal	costs,	which	pull	down	
average	costs	(Boardman	et	al.,	2011).	In	reality,	some	components	of	the	water	and	
wastewater	delivery	system	exhibit	economies	of	scale	and	falling	marginal	and	average	costs,	
but	others	may	exhibit	diseconomies	of	scale	and	increasing	marginal	costs.	For	example,	as	
water	scarcity	increases	and	water	utilities	go	farther	from	urban	centers	to	find	new	raw	water	
sources,	the	costs	of	the	incremental	water	supply	will	increase.	Similarly,	adding	desalinization	
facilities	increases	the	cost	of	raw	water	supplies.		But	raw	water	supplies	typically	constitute	
only	a	small	portion	(5‐10%)	of	the	total	costs	of	the	water	and	wastewater	services,	so	
increasing	costs	of	raw	water	supply	may	be	offset	by	economies	of	scale	in	the	piped	networks	
and	treatment	components.	Where	the	balance	lies	from	a	system‐wide	perspective	is	often	
unclear	for	a	specific	water	utility	at	a	particular	time,	and	the	relationship	between	the	system‐
wide	marginal	and	average	costs	is	rarely	explicitly	stated	in	analyses	of	the	consequences	of	
tariff	reforms.	
2.3.	Customers’	response	to	marginal	vs.	average	prices	
The	tariff	determines	the	relationship	between	average	and	marginal	prices	faced	by	a	
household.	For	example,	increasing	block	tariffs	create	a	price	differential	between	the	lower	
and	higher	blocks	so	that	average	volumetric	prices	are	below	marginal	prices	for	customers	
who	use	more	water	than	specified	in	the	first	(lifeline)	block.	Economic	theory	would	suggest	
that	a	rational,	observant	customer	would	respond	to	the	marginal	price	of	the	highest	price	
block	into	which	his	household’s	water	use	falls,	and	might	adjust	his	water	use	to	avoid	it	
falling	into	a	higher	price	block	of	the	tariff.	
There	are,	however,	three	main	reasons	why	customers	might	respond	to	average	prices	rather	
than	marginal	prices.	First,	complex	tariff	structures	can	be	difficult	to	decipher	for	customers,	
and	it	may	be	too	much	trouble	for	households	to	try	to	figure	out	how	to	respond	to	marginal	
prices.	Second,	many	utilities	charge	such	low	water	prices	(i.e.,	both	average	and	marginal	
prices	are	low)	that	households	simply	may	not	find	it	worth	the	trouble	to	think	about	
adjusting	their	water	use	to	marginal	prices.	Third,	households	may	have	difficulty	actually	
controlling	the	aggregate	use	of	multiple	household	members,	and	thus	the	household	unit	may	
fail	to	respond	to	the	marginal	price	signal.	
Ito	(2014)	finds	evidence	that	households	in	Southern	California	respond	to	average,	not	
marginal	water	prices.	We	consider	it	likely	that	households	in	many	developing	countries	also	
respond	to	average	instead	of	marginal	prices	because	water	prices	are	low	and	tariff	structures	
complex,	and	thus	marginal	prices	are	unlikely	to	be	salient	or	known	to	households.10	
But	as	tariffs	are	reformed	to	reflect	a	greater	portion	of	the	supply	costs,	marginal	prices	are	
likely	to	become	more	salient.	If	households	then	start	to	focus	on	what	is	driving	their	higher	
                                                                                                                                                                                        
lower	per	capita	consumption	than	high‐income	households	but	their	household	water	use	may	be	larger	
if	they	have	a	larger	family	size.	The	analysis	to	follow	is	made	at	the	household	level	to	avoid	specifying	
extra	assumptions	on	the	distribution	of	household	size	and	its	relationship	with	water	use	and	income. 
10	See	also	Strand	and	Walker	(2003)	for	further	empirical	evidence	on	households’	response	to	average	
rather	than	marginal	prices	in	several	cities	from	Central	America.	
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water	bills,	it	seems	plausible	that	households	will	shift	from	responding	to	average	prices	to	
responding	to	marginal	prices.	There	is	little	empirical	evidence	on	this	issue,	and	water	
professionals	rarely	make	explicit	their	assumption	about	whether	households	will	respond	to	
average	or	marginal	price.	Yet	it	is	a	critical	parameter	in	a	simulation	model	of	the	
consequences	of	a	tariff	reform	(see	also	Borenstein,	2012,	for	a	related	discussion).	
	
3.	Modeling	Strategy,	Assumptions,	and	Data	
We	assume	that	the	initial,	status	quo	situation	is	a	municipality	in	which	the	water	utility	uses	
a	UP	tariff	to	determine	the	water	bills	of	its	customers,	i.e.	all	customers	pay	the	same	
volumetric	price	no	matter	how	much	water	they	use.	This	utility	is	assumed	to	operate	under	
constant	returns	to	scale	from	a	system‐wide	perspective.	In	other	words,	economies	of	scale	in	
one	component	of	the	municipality’s	water	and	wastewater	supply	system	are	counterbalanced	
by	diseconomies	of	scale	in	other	components,	so	that	average	costs	equal	marginal	costs.	This	
assumption	is	consistent	with	empirical	evidence	that	average‐sized	utilities	are	characterized	
by	a	scale	factor	equal	or	close	to	one	in	some	industrialized	countries	(Saal	et	al.,	2013).		
The	uniform	volumetric	price	charged	to	households	is	equal	to	the	full	average	cost	of	
supplying	water	and	wastewater	services,	and	this	price	is	the	efficient	marginal	price	that	
reflects	the	full	cost	of	incremental	supply	(i.e.,	100%	cost	recovery).	There	is	no	subsidy	
distributed	to	any	of	the	households	and	no	price	distortion.	We	then	ask	the	question,	“What	
would	be	the	consequences	of	a	change	from	this	UP	tariff	structure	to	an	IBT	design	in	terms	of	
equity	(i.e.,	the	share	of	the	subsidies	that	goes	to	the	first	income	quintile)	and	economic	
efficiency,	under	two	different	levels	of	cost	recovery	(50%	and	100%)?”	
We	model	the	consequences	of	moving	from	the	UP	structure	to	nine	different	IBT	designs	
(Table	3).	All	of	the	IBT	designs	have	two	price	blocks:	1)	a	lower	(lifeline)	block,	and	2)	an	
upper	block.11		We	examine	IBTs	with	three	different	sizes	of	lifeline	blocks:	5	cubic	meters	
(m3),	10	m3,	and	15	m3	per	month.	We	assume	that	the	households’	monthly	water	bills	are	
determined	by	a	volumetric	component	and	a	fixed	charge.	For	each	of	the	three	sizes	of	lifeline	
blocks,	we	consider	three	levels	of	fixed	charge:	zero,	US$10	per	month,	and	US$15	per	month.	
The	levels	of	the	fixed	charge	and	sizes	of	the	lifeline	block	have	been	chosen	such	that	they	
reflect	common	practices	in	water	and	wastewater	utilities	globally.	
A	challenge	analysts	face	when	they	want	to	understand	how	changes	in	tariffs	affect	poor	
households	is	that	the	utility’s	customer	billing	records	do	not	include	information	on	
households’	income	and	other	socioeconomic	and	demographic	characteristics.	If	a	connection	
is	metered	and	used	solely	by	members	of	the	household,	a	utility	knows	how	much	water	the	
household	uses,	its	water	bill,	and	the	tariff	structure.	But	analysts	who	want	to	study	the	equity	
consequences	of	a	tariff	reform	need	a	procedure	for	matching	customers	billing	records	with	
household	income	(Fuente	et	al.,	2016).	
Our	approach	to	link	household	water	use	and	income	follows	Whittington	et	al.	(2015).	We	
assume	a	hypothetical	community	of	5000	households,	each	with	a	metered,	private	connection	
to	a	piped	water	and	wastewater	network.	The	analysis	of	households	with	shared	piped	
                                                            
11 In	most	water	and	wastewater	utilities	using	IBTs,	the	number	of	blocks	is	greater	than	two	(see	Figure	
1	in	Whittington	et	al.,	2015).	However	simulating	IBTs	with	more	than	two	blocks	would	increase	the	
size	of	the	possible	choice	set	in	terms	of	IBT	parameters	(size	of	the	blocks,	prices	in	each	block).	We	
believe	that	useful	and	relevant	insights	on	the	trade‐off	between	equity	and	economic	efficiency	are	
already	well	captured	with	a	two‐block	IBT. 
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connections	and	unmetered	connections	is	outside	the	scope	of	this	paper.	But	the	widespread	
presence	of	unmetered	connections	does	not	strengthen	the	argument	for	IBTs	because	IBTs	
can	only	be	used	to	determine	the	water	bills	for	households	with	metered	connections.	Using	
an	IBT	to	determine	the	water	bill	for	a	group	of	households	sharing	a	metered	connection	
actually	drives	the	average	price	of	households	in	the	group	higher	because	more	water	use	
occurs	in	the	higher	priced	blocks.	To	the	extent	that	poor	households	are	more	likely	to	use	
shared	connections	(and	to	share	a	connection	with	more	households),	they	will	be	adversely	
affected	by	an	IBT	(Whittington,	1992).	
We	focus	on	household	water	use	instead	of	per	capita	water	use	for	two	reasons.	First,	because	
our	data	are	hypothetical,	extending	the	analysis	to	compare	household	versus	per	capita	
results	would	have	required	making	additional	(ad‐hoc)	assumptions	on	the	distribution	of	
household	size	and	its	relationship	with	the	distribution	of	water	use	and	income.	Assumptions	
on	household	size	(in	order	to	calculate	per	capita	water	use)	would	add	another	layer	of	
uncertainty	into	our	simulation	model.	Second,	it	is	typically	not	possible	to	set	tariffs	that	
account	for	household	size.		Although	special	tariffs	for	large	households	have	been	deployed	in	
some	Spanish	cities	(Arbués	and	Barberán,	2012),	they	remain	extremely	uncommon	globally.12		
On	each	of	these	5000	households,	we	calculate	the	effects	of	the	shift	from	a	UP	(that	achieves	
100%	cost	recovery)	to	an	IBT	structure,	under	two	different	cost	recovery	constraints	(50%	or	
100%).	Individual	household	data	on	water	use	and	income	are	obtained	by	draws	from	two	
log‐normal	distributions	calibrated	using	the	OECD	household	survey	data	described	in	the	
previous	section.		
From	the	reported	household‐specific	data	on	water	use	and	income	from	these	eight	OECD	
countries,	we	estimate	a	log‐normal	distribution	for	household	monthly	water	use	with	location	
parameter	 2.61  	and	scale	parameter	 0.91  	(which	corresponds	to	a	mean	of	21	
m3/month	and	a	median	of	14	m3/month).	Similarly,	we	use	these	OECD	data	to	estimate	a	log‐
normal	distribution	for	household	monthly	income	with	location	parameter	 8.21  	and	scale	
parameter	 0.58  	(which	corresponds	to	an	average	monthly	income	of	US$4351	and	a	
median	of	US$3678).	
We	use	a	procedure	proposed	by	Johnson	and	Tenenbein	(1981)	and	described	in	Whittington	
et	al.	(2015)	to	draw	household‐specific	pairs	of	income	and	water	use	data	that	maintain	an	
assumed	overall	correlation	for	the	5000	households.	Thus,	an	important	assumption	
embedded	in	our	model	is	this	assumed	correlation	between	water	use	and	income.	We	run	
simulations	under	two	different	assumptions	about	the	correlation	between	water	use	and	
income.	We	first	assume	a	low	correlation	(Spearman’s	  	of	+0.1),	which	seems	to	be	realistic	
based	on	the	empirical	evidence	presented	in	Table	1.	We	then	test	to	see	how	our	findings	
change	under	the	assumption	of	a	high	(but	unrealistic)	correlation	between	water	use	and	
income	(+0.8).		
We	assume	a	price	elasticity	of	demand	of	‐0.2,	in	line	with	empirical	evidence	from	a	large	set	
of	countries	that	price	elasticity	is	quite	often	in	the	range	‐0.1	to	‐0.4	(Nauges	and	Whittington,	
2010;	Grafton	et	al.,	2011).	When	the	new	IBT	tariff	is	put	in	place,	households	will	face	a	price	
that	is	different	from	the	uniform	volumetric	price.	If	a	household	chooses	a	quantity	and	
associated	price	under	the	IBT	that	is	lower	than	with	the	uniform	volumetric	price,	its	water	
                                                            
12 One	reason	why	such	tariffs	are	unpopular	is	that	they	require	utilities	to	get	(reliable)	information	on	
the	size	of	the	households	that	they	supply,	and	keep	these	data	up‐to‐date.	In	most	low	and	middle‐
income	countries,	this	task	is	not	administratively	feasible	at	the	present	time.	Even	in	high‐income	
countries,	the	vast	majority	of	water	utilities	do	not	have	this	capability.	
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use	will	increase	(because	of	the	assumed	negative	non‐zero	price	elasticity).	In	contrast,	if	a	
household	chooses	a	quantity	with	a	higher	price	under	the	IBT	than	with	the	uniform	
volumetric	tariff,	its	water	use	will	decrease.	
We	assume	that	households	respond	to	average	price	rather	than	marginal	price.		We	test	the	
effect	of	assuming	that	households	respond	to	marginal	price	(see	“Model	Extensions”	below).	
The	average	cost	of	supplying	water	and	wastewater	services	is	assumed	to	be	US$5	per	cubic	
meter.		For	each	specific	IBT	tariff	design	presented	in	Table	3,	we	simulate	two	levels	of	cost	
recovery:	100%	or	full	cost	recovery	(i.e.	the	bills	paid	by	the	5000	households	generate	
revenues	that	exactly	cover	costs)	and	50%	cost	recovery	(i.e.	the	revenue	from	the	bills	only	
covers	half	of	the	costs).		
Because	there	is	an	infinity	of	pairs	of	prices	in	the	IBT	with	two	blocks	(price	in	the	lifeline	
block	and	price	in	the	upper	block)	that	could	achieve	the	specified	cost	recovery	level,	we	
assume	that	the	volumetric	price	of	water	in	the	lower	block	will	always	be	set	at	half	of	the	
price	of	the	upper	block.	We	needed	to	set	one	price	(either	the	price	in	the	first	block	or	the	
price	in	the	second	block)	in	order	to	be	able	to	find	a	unique	solution	that	achieves	the	pre‐
defined	cost	recovery	level.	We	decided	to	set	the	volumetric	price	in	the	first	(lifeline)	block	to	
half	the	price	in	the	upper	block	because	this	approximates	how	many	utilities	with	IBTs	set	
prices	in	different	blocks.13	As	a	consequence	of	this	assumption,	the	only	unknown	parameter	
is	the	price	of	the	upper	block.	Our	simulation	program	solves	for	the	price	in	the	upper	block	
that	achieves	the	specified	cost	recovery	constraint,	taking	into	account	that	the	quantity	of	
water	a	household	uses	responds	to	the	average	price	change.	
We	assume	that	household’s	monthly	water	use	has	a	lower	limit	of	5	m3	below	which	it	is	
insensitive	to	price	changes.	We	run	a	total	of	36	scenarios	(see	Appendix	A	for	characteristics	
of	each	scenario).	Each	scenario	is	run	100	times,	and	we	report	the	average	outcome	over	the	
100	replications	in	terms	of	the	quantity	of	water	used,	the	water	bill	paid,	and	the	performance	
indicators	for	our	three	criteria.	
We	assume	a	zero	income	elasticity	of	water	demand.14	The	income	elasticity	is	usually	found	to	
be	low,	around	+0.1	to	+0.3,	and	the	bill‐to‐income	ratio	is	generally	in	the	range	1‐3%.	As	a	
consequence,	the	quantity	effect	induced	by	the	income	change	would	be	insignificant,	and	we	
assume	it	can	be	ignored.	A	dynamic	simulation	model	of	a	tariff	reform	process	would	need	to	
incorporate	exogenous	changes	in	household	income	that	would	be	anticipated	over	the	
planning	horizon	of	the	simulation.	
Table	4	summarizes	the	main	assumptions	underpinning	the	calculations,	both	the	assumptions	
that	are	varied	and	those	that	are	not.	
	
                                                            
13 We	had	access	to	the	2011	Global	Water	Intelligence	database	on	water	and	wastewater	utilities	
worldwide.	150	out	of	the	308	utilities	listed	in	the	database	used	IBTs.	For	these	150	utilities	we	
calculated	the	following	ratio:	price	in	lifeline	block/price	in	the	second	block.	This	ratio	varied	from	0	
(when	water	in	the	lifeline	block	is	free)	to	0.97.	The	mean	was	0.47	and	the	median	was	0.52.	For	more	
information	on	Global	Water	Intelligence	utility	surveys,	see	https://www.globalwaterintel.com/;	
accessed	5	October	2016.	
14	Income	effects	are	also	ignored	in	Borenstein	(2012).	We	are	aware	that	the	assumption	of	a	zero	
income	elasticity	of	demand	is	inconsistent	with	the	assumption	of	a	0.8	correlation	between	water	use	
and	income.	The	high	correlation	case,	which	is	unrealistic,	should	be	seen	simply	as	an	exercise	to	
illustrate	how	our	main	findings	would	change	if	water	use	and	income	was	highly	correlated.		
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4.	Quantifying	the	Performance	of	Alternative	Tariff	Structures	in	terms	of	Three	
Criteria:	Financial	Self‐Sufficiency,	Equity,	and	Economic	Efficiency	
The	implementation	of	a	new	tariff	in	a	community	changes	the	prices	households	face,	the	
quantity	of	water	they	use,	and	the	amount	of	the	water	bill	they	pay	to	the	utility.	We	assess	
how	these	changes	affect	two	criteria:	distribution	of	subsidies	(equity)	and	economic	efficiency	
(welfare	gains	and	losses),	under	two	different	levels	of	cost	recovery	for	the	new	IBT	(50%	and	
100%).	We	report	the	consequences	of	the	change	in	tariff	structure	from	a	UP	design	(where	
cost	recovery	is	always	100%)	to	each	of	the	nine	IBT	designs	in	terms	of	these	two	criteria	
under	the	two	cost	recovery	levels.15		
4.1.	Financial	self‐sufficiency	(cost	recovery)	
The	cost	recovery	level	(either	50%	or	100%)	enters	as	a	constraint	in	our	simulation	model.	
Financial	self‐sufficiency	requires	that	the	revenues	the	utility	receives	in	total	from	all	its	
customers	(5000	households	in	our	calculations)	are	equal	to	the	total	costs	of	providing	these	
customers	with	water	and	wastewater	services.	There	is	a	continuum	from	zero	cost	recovery	
(in	which	case	the	utility	provides	all	of	its	customers	with	free	services)	to	100%	cost	recovery	
(the	utility	does	not	receive	any	financial	subsidies	from	higher	levels	of	government).	The	
majority	of	water	utilities	in	low‐income	countries	fall	on	the	low	end	of	this	continuum;	few	
achieve	more	than	50%	cost	recovery.	Many	operate	with	only	10‐25%	cost	recovery.16	Some	of	
their	operating	costs,	and	essentially	all	of	their	capital	costs,	are	paid	by	higher‐level	
government	authorities	or	donors.	Even	in	high‐income	countries	relatively	few	water	utilities	
actually	achieve	100%	cost	recovery	(cf.	Table	1	in	Reynaud,	2016).	
If	a	water	utility	does	achieve	100%	cost	recovery,	the	financial	self‐sufficiency	objective	is	fully	
satisfied.	But	this	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	all	of	its	customers	pay	the	full	costs	of	the	
services	they	receive.	But	if	one	group	of	households	pays	less	than	its	full	costs	of	service,	
another	group	of	households	must	pay	more	than	its	costs	of	services	so	that	in	aggregate	the	
revenues	received	from	all	its	customers	equal	the	costs	of	serving	all	customers.		
If	a	water	utility	achieves	50%	cost	recovery,	financial	self‐sufficiency	is	not	achieved,	but	
perhaps	the	equity	criterion	is	better	than	if	100%	cost	recovery	was	achieved.	But	even	if	
revenues	only	cover	50%	of	the	total	costs	of	serving	the	utility’s	customers,	this	does	not	
necessarily	mean	that	all	customers	pay	less	than	their	costs	of	service.	It	is	still	possible	that	
some	customers	could	pay	more	than	their	costs	of	services,	in	which	case	others	would	pay	
much	less.		
The	water	bill	is	calculated	for	each	of	the	5000	households	using	the	household’s	water	use	(Qi)	
under	the	new	tariff	structure.	For	example,	if	the	water	utility	used	an	IBT	tariff	structure	with	
a	lifeline	block	of	10	m3,	the	price	in	the	upper	block	was	P*,	there	was	no	fixed	charge,	and	Qi	>	
10	m3,	the	water	bill	for	household	i	(WBi)	would	be	…	
	 WBi	=	[10	m3	x	0.5	x	P*]	+	[(Qi	–	10	m3)	x	P*]	 	 	 	 	 	 (1)	
                                                            
15 The	consequences	of	moving	from	an	existing	IBT	tariff	to	a	uniform	volumetric	tariff	would	be	the	
reverse	(the	negative)	of	the	changes	in	criteria	reported	here.  
16 Using	data	from	about	4000	utilities	from	over	130	countries	over	the	2006‐2011	years,	Danilenko	et	
al.	(2014)	report	that:	“the	percentage	of	utilities	[in	low‐income	countries]	that	could	not	cover	even	
operation	and	maintenance	(O&M)	costs	increased	from	28	percent	in	2000	to	50	percent	in	2010.	Lower	
middle‐income	countries	were	the	most	affected,	with	70	percent	not	able	to	cover	their	O&M	costs.	
Upper	middle‐income	countries	seem	less	affected,	partially	because	many	continued	to	grow	their	
economies	rapidly;	but	even	among	these	countries,	40	percent	of	water	and	sanitation	utilities	were	not	
able	to	cover	their	basic	O&M	costs.” 
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Assume	the	average	total	production	cost	per	cubic	meter	is	AC,	then	the	subsidy	received	by	
household	i	(SUBi)	is17	…	 	 		
	 SUBi	=	(AC	x	Qi)	‐	WBi		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (2)	
The	total	revenues	received	by	the	utility	from	the	5000	households	(TOTREV)	and	the	total	
subsidies	provided	to	the	5000	households	(TOTSUB)	are	…	
	 TOTREV	=	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (3)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 (4)	
Cost	recovery	is	100%	when	TOTSUB	=	0.	Cost	recovery	is	50%	when	…	
TOTSUB	=	TOTREV,		and	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (5)	
TOTSUB	+	TOTREV	=	AC	x		Σ5000	Qi	 	 	 	 	 	 															(6)
	 	
4.2.	Equity	
Concerns	about	the	equitable	provision	of	municipal	water	and	wastewater	services	can	be	
defined	and	measured	in	numerous	ways.	For	example,	one	could	calculate	an	affordability	
indicator	that	expresses	each	household’s	water	bill	as	a	percent	of	its	income.	If	water	and	
wastewater	expenditures	exceed	a	specified	percentage,	then	the	tariff	has	generated	water	
bills	for	at	least	some	households	that	are	“unaffordable.”	This	is	then	judged	to	be	a	negative	
attribute	of	that	specific	tariff	design.	Alternatively,	one	could	also	analyze	whether	similar	
households	received	similar	water	bills.	If	they	did	not,	this	might	be	considered	inequitable	
even	if	the	water	bills	were	affordable.	
In	this	paper	we	propose	to	measure	equity	by	reporting	the	distribution	of	subsidies	across	
different	income	groups.	We	calculate	the	share	of	the	total	subsidies	received	by	households	in	
each	income	quintile	j	(ShareSUBIQj)	as	…	
	
	 	 	 for	j	=	1,	…,	5	 	 	 	 (7)	
Because	this	result	is	dependent	on	the	specific	draw	of	5000	household	income	and	water	use	
pairs,	we	do	this	calculation	a	hundred	times,	and	then	calculate	the	average	of	the	share	of	the	
total	subsidies	received	by	households	in	each	income	quintile	j	(ShareSUBIQj)	over	the	hundred	
replications.	The	result	is	our	best	estimate	of	the	share	of	total	subsidies	received	by	
households	in	each	income	quintile	for	the	specific	IBT	tariff	under	consideration.	We	then	
compare	the	change	in	the	distribution	of	subsidies	under	the	UP	and	new	IBT	tariff.	We	define	
a	tariff	that	targets	a	larger	percentage	of	the	available	subsidies	to	households	in	the	first	
income	quintile	as	more	equitable.	
	
                                                            
17 Depending	on	the	level	of	the	average	cost	and	characteristics	of	the	water	tariff,	the	subsidy	could	be	
negative.	In	this	case	households	in	one	income	quintile	would	provide	cross‐subsidies	to	households	in	
other	income	quintiles.	
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4.3.	Economic	efficiency	
We	calculate	the	welfare	change	due	to	the	shift	from	the	status	quo	UP	design	to	one	of	the	new	
IBT	alternatives	in	Table	3	by	measuring	the	change	in	consumer’s	surplus	resulting	from	the	
price	change	that	each	of	the	5000	households	experiences.	We	use	the	calculation	method	
proposed	by	Hausman	(1981),	who	showed	that,	if	the	household’s	water	demand	function	is	of	
the	log‐log	form	(the	most	commonly	estimated	functional	form),	then	the	change	in	surplus	can	
be	computed	analytically,	as	described	below.	
A	log‐log	household’s	demand	function	for	water	is	specified	as	follows:	
   
2
ln ln ln
J
j j
j
Q P X  

   	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (8)	
where	Q	is	household’s	water	use,	P	is	the	average	price	and	X	a	set	of	household	characteristics.	
 	is	the	price	elasticity	of	demand.	If	we	apply	the	exponential	to	both	sides	of	equation	(8),	we	
have:		
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So	the	demand	function	for	water	is	equivalently	written	as:	
.Q AP 	where	
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The	change	in	surplus	( S )	following	a	change	in	price	from	P0	(the	UP	price)	to	P1	(the	
average	price	under	an	IBT)	is	calculated	from	the	demand	curve	as:	
    1
0
1 1
1 0. 1
P
P
AS A P dP P P  
       	 	 	 	 	 	 													(11)	
The	change	in	surplus	depicted	in	(11)	remains	valid	whether	P1	is	greater	or	less	than	P0,	i.e.,	P1	
(the	average	price	under	the	new	IBT)	can	be	above	or	below	the	UP	price	P0,	and	the	
calculation	of	the	surplus	experienced	by	the	household	(either	positive	or	negative)	remains	
correct.	
In	order	to	calculate	the	change	in	surplus,	one	needs	information	on	P0,	P1,	price	elasticity	of	
demand	and	A.		Our	simulation	program	generates	the	initial	water	use	for	each	household	(Q),	
and	we	have	made	the	assumption	that	the	price	elasticity 	is	‐0.2.	The	initial	UP	price	(P0)	is	
known	since	we	assume	uniform	volumetric	pricing	(for	100%	cost	recovery,	P0=	US$5	per	m3).	
The	average	price	under	the	IBT	is	calculated	for	each	household	once	their	water	use	is	
determined	following	the	change	to	an	assumed	IBT	design.	The	only	term	missing	in	the	
calculation	of	the	change	in	the	household’s	consumer	surplus	is	A,	which	we	infer	from	Q,	P	and	
 	using	(10):		
0
QA
P  		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (12)	
In	addition	to	the	change	in	consumer	surplus	experienced	by	the	household,	we	measure	the	
deadweight	loss	suffered	by	society	as	a	result	of	the	shift	to	an	IBT	structure.	 For	this	
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calculation	we	estimate	the	subsidies	taxpayers	are	paying	to	the	utility	when	cost	recovery	is	
lower	than	100%.	
	
5.	Results	
5.1.	Benchmark	Case:	IBT	0‐10:	Cost	recovery	=	50%;	Income‐Water	Use	Correlation	=	+0.1	
We	first	examine	the	consequences	of	our	benchmark	case,	a	shift	from	the	uniform	volumetric	
price	tariff	(UP‐0)	to	an	IBT	with	no	fixed	charge,	cost	recovery	of	50%,	and	a	correlation	
between	household	income	and	water	use	of	+0.1.	These	assumptions	approximate	conditions	
in	numerous	cities	around	the	world.	Our	simulation	model	finds	prices	for	the	IBT	that	achieve	
50%	cost	recovery:	US$1.6	per	m3	for	the	first	(lifeline)	block	and	US$3.2	per	m3	for	the	upper	
block.	
On	average	over	the	100	replications,	1753	households	(35%)	fall	into	the	lifeline	block	and	
3247	households	(65%)	fall	into	the	upper	block.		Average	monthly	household	water	use	and	
average	monthly	water	bill	vary	modestly	across	income	quintiles	from	20	m3	and	US$49	
respectively	in	the	poorest	quintile	to	26	m3	and	US$66	in	the	richest.	
The	assumption	that	cost	recovery	is	50%	means	that	there	are	substantial	subsidies	to	be	
distributed	from	taxpayers	to	the	utility’s	customers	under	the	IBT	tariff.18	However,	our	results	
show	that,	from	an	equity	perspective,	the	shift	from	a	UP	tariff	to	this	IBT	has	only	delivered	a	
small	portion	of	these	subsidies	to	households	in	the	poorest	quintile.	Under	the	IBT	households	
in	the	poorest	quintile	receive	only	18%	of	the	total	subsidies	(an	average	monthly	subsidy	of	
US$51);	households	in	the	richest	quintile	receive	22%	(an	average	monthly	subsidy	of	US$63),	
a	proportionately	larger	share.		
The	main	reason	that	the	IBT	has	not	delivered	subsidies	more	effectively	to	poor	households	is	
that	the	price	of	water	and	wastewater	services	in	the	upper	block	is	below	the	average	cost	of	
providing	these	services,	so	all	households	are	receiving	subsidies	and	the	more	water	a	
household	uses,	the	more	subsidies	it	receives.	Because	the	correlation	between	income	and	
water	use	is	positive	(although	low),	rich	households	on	average	use	more	water	than	poor	
households	and	thus	receive	more	subsidies.	This	situation,	in	which	the	price	of	water	in	the	
upper	block	of	an	IBT	is	below	average	cost,	is	quite	common	in	many	water	utilities,	especially	
in	low‐income	countries.	We	conclude	that	in	the	benchmark	case,	the	shift	from	the	UP	to	the	
IBT	tariff	is	not	attractive	from	the	perspective	of	our	equity	criterion.	
From	the	perspective	of	economic	efficiency,	the	results	in	Table	5	show	that	the	shift	to	the	
IBT‐0‐10	has	resulted	in	welfare	gains	(increased	consumer	surplus)	to	all	households	because	
all	households	experience	a	reduction	in	their	average	price	compared	to	the	UP.	These	welfare	
gains	are	less	than	the	value	of	the	subsidies	received	because	at	the	margin	the	subsidized	
water	is	not	worth	as	much	to	a	household	as	it	costs	the	utility	to	supply.	The	average	monthly	
welfare	gain	to	households	is	US$53,	but	this	comes	at	a	cost	to	taxpayers	of	US$57.	The	average	
welfare	gain	for	households	in	the	poorest	quintile	(US$47)	is	less	than	the	welfare	gain	for	
                                                            
18 Of	course,	there	is	substantial	overlap	between	taxpayers	and	household	water	users.	It	is	possible	that	
the	community,	in	aggregate,	may	self‐finance	the	cost	recovery	shortfall,	but	equity	concerns	may	arise	
from	the	incidence	of	local	taxes	as	compared	to	the	water	tariff	subsidies.		In	some	local	situations,	poor	
households	may	avoid	paying	most	taxes.	It	is	also	possible	that	some	or	all	of	the	financial	shortfall	may	
be	financed	by	central	government	or	by	international	aid	agencies.	Another	way	of	financing	the	shortfall	
(popular	in	both	industrialized	and	developing	countries)	is	through	deferred	maintenance,	which	
amounts	to	a	generational	shift	in	cost	incidence.	
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households	in	the	richest	quintile	(US$58).	The	resulting	societal	(deadweight)	loss	is	
US$22,938	per	month	for	the	community	of	5000	households	(approximately	US$4.6	per	
household	per	month).	
The	result	of	the	shift	from	a	UP	tariff	to	this	benchmark	IBT	has	reduced	economic	efficiency	
and	induced	some	societal	loss.	With	a	50%	cost	recovery	constraint,	water	use	is	subsidized	
but	rich	households	receive	a	larger	proportion	of	subsidies	than	poor	households.	In	other	
words,	there	is	no	trade‐off	between	equity	and	economic	efficiency	from	this	policy	
intervention	given	our	assumptions.		
5.2.	What	happens	if	the	size	of	the	lifeline	block	changes?	(IBT‐0‐5,	IBT‐0‐15)	
	
Figure	1	illustrates	how	changes	in	the	size	of	the	lifeline	block	affect	the	average	water	price.	
As	shown,	a	small	lifeline	block	(e.g.	5	m3)	entails	higher	average	prices	because	at	low	levels	of	
water	use	a	higher	proportion	of	a	household’s	total	water	use	is	charged	at	the	rate	in	the	
upper	block.	However,	changing	the	size	of	the	lifeline	block	has	only	a	small	effect	on	the	water	
use,	water	bills,	the	average	subsidy	received,	and	the	percent	of	subsidies	received	by	different	
income	quintiles,	compared	to	the	benchmark	case.		
Our	simulation	model	finds	prices	for	IBT‐0‐5	that	achieve	50%	cost	recovery:	US$2.4	per	m3	
for	the	first	(lifeline)	block	and	US$4.9	per	m3	for	the	upper	block.	Reducing	the	lifeline	block	
from	10	m3	to	5	m3	results	in	average	monthly	water	use	of	23	m3,	the	same	as	the	benchmark	
case,	ranging	from	20	m3	in	the	lowest	quintile	to	26	m3	in	the	richest	quintile.	The	average	
water	bill	is	US$57	(the	same	as	in	the	benchmark	case),	ranging	from	US$49	in	the	poorest	
quintile	to	US$66	in	the	richest	quintile.	The	average	monthly	subsidy	is	US$57	(same	as	the	
benchmark	case),	ranging	from	US$51	in	the	poorest	quintile	to	US$64	in	the	richest	quintile.	
With	a	lifeline	block	of	5	m3,	the	welfare	gains	to	households	are	essentially	the	same	as	the	
benchmark	case	(US$53).	Deadweight	losses	decrease	about	5%	because	more	households	
respond	to	an	average	price	closer	to	the	marginal	cost.	
Increasing	the	size	of	the	lifeline	block	has	small	effects	in	the	opposite	direction.	Our	
simulation	model	finds	prices	for	the	IBT‐0‐15	that	achieve	50%	cost	recovery:	US$2.4	per	m3	
for	the	first	(lifeline)	block	and	US$4.9	per	m3	for	the	upper	block.	Increasing	the	lifeline	block	
from	10	m3	to	15	m3	results	in	average	monthly	water	use	of	23	m3,	ranging	from	20	m3	in	the	
lowest	quintile	to	26	m3	in	the	richest	quintile.	The	average	water	bill	is	US$57	(the	same	as	in	
the	benchmark	case),	ranging	from	US$49	in	the	poorest	quintile	to	US$66	in	the	richest	
quintile.	The	average	monthly	subsidy	is	US$57	(same	as	the	benchmark	case),	ranging	from	
US$51	in	the	poorest	quintile	to	US$64	in	the	richest	quintile.	With	a	lifeline	block	of	15	m3,	the	
welfare	gains	to	households	are	almost	the	same	as	in	the	benchmark	case	(<1%	difference).	
Deadweight	losses	increase	about	3%	because	the	price	distortion	is	increased	as	more	
households	respond	to	an	average	price	farther	from	the	marginal	cost.	
Reducing	the	size	of	the	lifeline	block	decreases	deadweight	losses	without	much	effect	on	the	
distribution	of	subsidies	across	income	quintiles.	But	the	key	message	is	that	changing	the	size	
of	the	lifeline	block	does	not	change	our	main	result	that	the	shift	from	a	uniform	volumetric	
tariff	to	this	benchmark	IBT	has	reduced	economic	efficiency	and	done	nothing	to	improve	
equity	when	cost	recovery	is	50%	and	the	correlation	between	household	income	and	water	use	
is	+0.1.	
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5.3.	What	happens	if	a	positive	fixed	charge	is	added	to	the	volumetric	component	of	the	IBT?	(IBT‐
10‐10,	IBT‐15‐10)	
	
Adding	a	positive	fixed	charge	to	the	volumetric	component	of	a	water	bill	is	common	practice.19	
The	fixed	charge	is	especially	attractive	to	utility	managers	because	it	increases	revenue	
stability.	Figure	2	illustrates	how	the	average	water	price	(US$/m3)	changes	as	a	function	of	
monthly	water	use	(m3)	under	three	IBT	tariffs	with	a	positive	fixed	charge	and	two	sizes	of	the	
LLB:	5m3	and	10m3	per	month.	As	shown,	a	positive	fixed	charge	results	in	high	average	water	
prices	at	low	levels	of	water	use.	The	average	price	first	falls	as	water	use	increases	as	the	fixed	
charge	is	spread	over	higher	water	use,	but	then	rises	as	more	and	more	water	is	billed	at	the	
price	of	the	upper	block.	
	
Our	simulation	model	finds	prices	for	IBT‐10‐10	that	achieve	50%	cost	recovery:	US$1.3	per	m3	
for	the	first	(lifeline)	block	and	US$2.6	per	m3	for	the	upper	block.	Adding	a	fixed	charge	of	
US$10	per	month	while	maintaining	the	50%	cost	recovery	target	again	results	in	similar	
average	monthly	water	use	and	water	bills	as	the	benchmark	case.		Water	bills	for	households	in	
the	poorest	quintile	and	the	subsidies	they	receive	are	essentially	the	same	as	for	the	
benchmark	case.	Households	in	the	richest	quintile	still	receive	a	larger	share	of	the	total	
subsidies	(23%)	than	households	in	the	poorest	quintile	(18%).	
	
With	a	fixed	charge	of	US$10	per	month,	the	welfare	gains	to	households	are	almost	the	same	as	
in	the	benchmark	case.	Deadweight	losses	decrease	about	8%	because	more	households	
respond	to	an	average	price	closer	to	the	marginal	cost.	Adding	a	fixed	charge	does	create	a	
modest	efficiency	vs.	equity	trade‐off:	a	higher	fixed	charge	increases	economic	efficiency	at	the	
expense	of	poor	households.	Increasing	the	size	of	the	fixed	charge	(e.g.	IBT‐15‐10)	accentuates	
this	trade‐off.	But	again	the	key	message	is	that	adding	a	positive	fixed	charge	does	not	change	
our	main	result	that	the	shift	from	a	UP	tariff	to	this	benchmark	IBT	has	reduced	economic	
efficiency	and	done	nothing	to	improve	equity.		
	
5.4.	What	are	the	consequences	of	increasing	the	cost	recovery	constraint	to	100%?	(IBT‐0‐10)	
	
Table	6	shows	the	changes	that	result	from	a	shift	from	an	UP	tariff	to	an	IBT	(with	a	lifeline	
block	of	10	m3	and	no	fixed	charge)	in	which	the	prices	in	the	lower	and	upper	blocks	are	set	to	
achieve	100%	cost	recovery.	One	can	also	compare	the	results	in	Table	6	with	the	results	for	the	
benchmark	case	presented	in	Table	5	to	see	the	consequences	of	increasing	the	cost	recovery	
target	from	50%	to	100%,	holding	other	parameters	in	the	simulation	model	constant.		
The	implications	of	increasing	the	cost	recovery	constraint	from	50%	to	100%	are	far	reaching.	
Our	simulation	model	finds	prices	for	IBT‐0‐10	that	achieve	100%	cost	recovery:	US$3.2	per	m3	
for	the	first	(lifeline)	block	and	US$6.4	per	m3	for	the	upper	block.	Because	the	simulation	model	
forces	the	100%	cost	recovery	target	to	be	achieved,	there	are	no	subsidies	provided	by	
taxpayers.		There	are,	however,	cross‐subsidies	between	households.	On	average	over	the	100	
replications,	3614	households	receive	subsidies,	and	1386	households	make	“excess	payments”	
above	their	costs	of	services.		The	average	monthly	water	use	of	the	3614	households	that	
receive	subsidies	is	only	11‐12	m3	in	all	five	quintiles.	Their	average	water	bill	is	US$46,	and	the	
range	across	the	quintiles	is	small	(from	US$43	per	month	in	the	poorest	quintile,	to	US$49	in	
the	richest).		
                                                            
19 A	policy	allowing	a	household	to	finance	its	initial	connection	cost	to	the	piped	network,	and	making	
periodic	payments	on	its	water	bill,	would	have	a	similar	effect	on	average	prices	as	adding	a	positive	
fixed	charge	to	the	volumetric	component	of	a	household’s	water	bill.	
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One	would	hope	that	rich	households	cross‐subsidized	poor	households,	but	Table	6	shows	that	
this	is	not	the	case.	The	3614	households	receiving	subsidies	are	distributed	relatively	evenly	
across	the	income	quintiles,	from	770	households	in	the	poorest	quintile	to	673	households	in	
the	richest.	These	3614	households	receive	an	average	monthly	subsidy	of	US$11.3,	with	little	
variation	in	the	size	of	the	subsidy	across	income	quintiles	(from	US$11.4	in	the	poorest	quintile	
to	US$11.2	in	the	richest).	Only	21%	of	the	cross‐subsidies	are	received	by	households	in	the	
poorest	quintile.	So	just	as	is	the	case	when	subsidies	are	paid	by	taxpayers	in	the	50%	cost	
recovery	benchmark	case,	the	cross‐subsidies	in	the	100%	cost	recovery	case	are	not	well‐
targeted	to	the	poor.	
The	1386	households	that	make	“excess	payments”	above	their	costs	of	services	are	distributed	
throughout	the	income	distribution.	Only	24%	of	these	households	making	excess	payments	are	
in	the	richest	quintile.	These	1386	households	use	much	more	water	per	month	than	the	
households	receiving	subsidies.	Their	average	monthly	water	use	and	average	water	bill	are	45	
m3	and	US$254	respectively,	ranging	from	43	m3	and	US$241	in	the	poorest	quintile	to	47	m3	
and	US$267	in	the	richest	quintile.		The	fact	that	these	water	bills	seem	so	high	reinforces	our	
point	that	few	water	utilities	even	in	industrialized	countries	actually	achieve	100%	cost	
recovery.20	
For	the	3614	households	receiving	subsidies,	they	experienced	an	average	welfare	gain	of	
US$11	per	month	compared	to	the	UP	tariff.	In	the	benchmark	case	the	average	welfare	gain	
was	US$53	per	month	for	all	households,	so	these	3614	households	receiving	subsidies	are	
unsurprisingly	much	worse	off	in	the	100%	cost	recovery	case	than	with	50%	cost	recovery.	For	
the	1386	households	making	excess	payments,	their	average	welfare	loss	is	US$30	per	month,	
instead	of	a	welfare	gain	of	approximately	US$53	in	the	50%	cost	recovery	case.	But	taxpayers	
benefit	compared	to	the	benchmark	case	because	they	no	longer	provide	any	subsidies.	There	is	
still	a	small	deadweight	loss	for	society	(about	US$0.40	per	month	per	household)	that	results	
from	the	price	distortion	introduced	by	the	IBT.		
Cost	recovery	of	100%,	coupled	with	the	IBT‐0‐10	tariff,	shifts	the	costs	of	provision	from	
taxpayers	to	water	users,	and	creates	a	cross‐subsidy	from	large	water	users	to	small	water	
users.	But	because	the	correlation	between	household	income	and	water	use	is	low,	the	cross	
subsidies	are	not	flowing	from	rich	to	poor	households.	There	are	many	poor	and	middle	
income	households	with	high	water	use	cross‐subsidizing	other	middle‐income	and	rich	
households.		
The	shift	to	100%	cost	recovery	compared	to	our	benchmark	IBT‐0‐10	with	50%	cost	recovery	
has	achieved	the	financial	self‐sufficiency	objective	and	shifted	the	financial	costs	away	from	
taxpayers.	The	societal	deadweight	losses	are	almost	eliminated	compared	to	the	benchmark	
case	but	it	is	difficult	to	conclude	that	equity	has	been	improved	compared	to	the	UP	tariff	
because	the	cross‐subsidies	are	poorly	targeted.	Large	water	users	are	providing	modest	cross	
subsidies	to	low	water	users,	but	many	of	the	households	making	excess	payments	are	poor	and	
many	of	the	households	receiving	subsidies	are	rich.		
	
5.5.	What	happens	to	the	results	of	the	benchmark	case	(IBT‐0‐10)	if	the	correlation	between	
household	income	and	water	use	is	high	(+0.8)	instead	of	low	(+0.1)?	
	
Intuition	might	suggest	that	equity	(i.e.	the	share	of	subsidies	targeting	poor	households)	would	
                                                            
20 A	monthly	bill	of	US$254	corresponds	to	about	6%	of	the	household	average	income	(US$4351)	in	our	
setting,	which	is	far	above	the	average	affordability	ratio	estimated	in	industrialized	countries,	usually	in	
the	range	0.5‐2%	(cf.	Table	7	in	Reynaud,	2016). 
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improve	if	the	correlation	between	household	income	and	water	use	is	higher,	but	this	is	
incorrect	if	the	cost	recovery	constraint	is	50%.	Assuming	a	50%	cost	recovery	constraint	and	a	
correlation	between	household	income	and	water	use	of	+0.8,	our	simulation	model	finds	prices	
for	IBT‐0‐10:	US$1.6	per	m3	for	the	first	(lifeline)	block	and	US$3.1	per	m3	for	the	upper	block.	
Average	monthly	household	water	use	is	23	m3	and	average	water	bill	is	US$57,	ranging	from	8	
m3	and	US$13	in	the	poorest	quintile	to	39	m3	and	US$144	in	the	richest.	But	households	in	the	
poorest	quintile	only	receive	9%	of	the	total	subsidies	(corresponding	to	an	average	of	US$25	
per	household);	households	in	the	richest	quintile	receive	39%	(or	US$112	per	household).	
IBTs	do	even	worse	targeting	subsidies	to	poor	households	when	the	correlation	is	high	than	
when	it	is	low	if	cost	recovery	is	also	low	(as	in	the	benchmark	case).	This	is	because	all	of	the	
water	that	the	utility	sells	is	sold	below	average	cost,	so	the	more	water	a	household	uses,	the	
more	subsidies	it	receives—and	rich	households	use	much	more	water	than	poor	households	if	
the	correlation	is	high.	
If	the	correlation	were	+0.8,	the	average	household	welfare	gain	would	be	US$53,	but	it	is	only	
US$22	for	households	in	the	poorest	quintile,	compared	to	US$105	for	households	in	the	richest	
quintile.	So	households	in	the	poorest	quintile	would	be	much	worse	off	than	in	the	benchmark	
case,	in	which	their	average	welfare	gain	was	US$47	per	month.	
There	are	no	cross‐subsidies	in	this	case,	so	all	the	subsidies	received	by	households	are	paid	by	
taxpayers.	Because	the	value	of	the	total	subsidies	paid	by	taxpayers	is	greater	than	the	welfare	
gain	received	by	households,	a	societal	deadweight	loss	of	US$22,913	per	month	remains	for	the	
community	of	5000	households	(approximately	US$4.6	per	household	per	month),	essentially	
equivalent	to	the	deadweight	loss	in	the	benchmark	case.		
We	emphasize	that	we	consider	this	high	correlation	case	for	illustrative	purposes.	The	
correlation	between	household	income	and	water	use	is	not	something	that	the	utility	or	social	
planner	can	control,	and	it	is	unlikely	that	the	correlation	will	be	this	high	(+0.8).		
5.6.	What	happens	if	both	the	cost	recovery	constraint	is	high	(100%)	and	the	correlation	between	
income	and	water	use	is	high	(+0.8)?	
To	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	this	combination	of	parameters	does	not	exist	in	any	water	utility	
today.		A	small	portion	of	water	utilities	in	industrialized	countries	may	be	recovering	close	to	
full	long	run	supply	costs,	but	most	are	not.	The	majority	of	water	utilities	in	developing	
countries	are	recovering	less	than	50%	of	total	costs,	many	much	less.		And	although	the	data	on	
the	correlation	between	household	income	and	water	use	are	sparse,	there	is	no	indication	from	
any	of	our	datasets	(Table	1)	that	the	correlation	is	above	+0.5,	certainly	not	as	high	as	+0.8.	
Nevertheless,	it	is	important	to	consider	this	case	because	it	is	here	that	the	IBT	does	in	fact	
offer	some	advantages	in	terms	of	equity	compared	to	the	UP	design,	and	this	is	the	case	that	
many	water	professionals	(mistakenly)	have	in	mind	when	they	recommend	IBTs.	
Figure	3	shows	the	distribution	of	subsidies	across	household	income	quintiles	for	four	
combinations	of	percent	cost	recovery	and	correlation	between	household	income	and	water	
use	for	an	IBT	with	a	lifeline	block	of	10	m3	and	no	fixed	charge:	1)	50%	cost	recovery;	+0.1	
correlation	(NW	cell);	2)	50%	cost	recovery;	+0.8	correlation	(NE	cell);	3)	100%	cost	recovery;	
+0.1	correlation	(SW	cell);	and	4)	100%	cost	recovery;	and+0.8	correlation	(SE	cell).	Case	1	is	
our	benchmark	case.	Moving	from	Case	1	to	Case	4	(from	NW	to	SE)	does	improve	the	
distribution	of	subsidies	across	income	quintiles	substantially.	Case	4	is	the	only	one	of	the	four	
cases	in	which	poor	households	receive	a	much	higher	proportion	of	the	total	subsidies	than	
rich	households.	But	note	that	Case	4	requires	100%	cost	recovery,	so	although	the	distribution	
of	subsidies	is	improved,	the	absolute	magnitude	of	the	subsidies	delivered	is	small.		
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The	welfare	gains	to	poor	households	are	much	smaller	in	Case	4	than	in	Cases	1	and	2.	The	
main	beneficiaries	of	the	100%	cost	recovery	constraint	are	taxpayers,	not	poor	households	
(although	poor	households	also	may	pay	taxes).	Moreover,	the	correlation	between	household	
income	and	water	use	is	exogenous	(outside	the	control	of	the	water	utility),	so	a	water	utility	
with	a	low	correlation	(Cases	1	and	3)	cannot	simply	choose	to	move	to	Case	4	to	improve	
subsidy	targeting.	
Figure	4	presents	the	cumulative	distribution	of	subsidies	as	a	function	of	income	percentile	for	
the	four	cases	in	Figure	3.	The	two	cases	with	a	correlation	between	household	income	and	
water	use	of	+0.1	are	close	to	45‐degree	lines,	meaning	that	subsidies	are	evenly	distributed	to	
households	throughout	the	income	distribution.		The	two	cases	with	a	correlation	between	
household	income	and	water	use	of	+0.8	are	different.	The	case	with	50%	cost	recovery	and	a	
correlation	of	+0.8	shows	a	distribution	of	subsidies	skewed	toward	the	rich.	The	case	with	
100%	cost	recovery	and	a	correlation	of	+0.8	shows	a	distribution	of	subsidies	skewed	toward	
the	poor.	
We	believe	most	water	utilities,	especially	in	developing	countries,	are	probably	closer	to	Case	1	
in	the	typology	shown	in	Figure	3	than	to	the	other	three	cases.	Utilities	in	industrialized	
countries	are	on	a	continuum	between	Case	1	and	Case	3.		Although	some	water	professionals	
probably	imagine	that	there	are	many	utilities	in	Case	2,	we	think	this	is	very	unlikely.	But	this	
is,	in	fact,	fortunate	because	in	Case	2	households	in	the	richer	quintiles	receive	the	majority	of	
the	subsidies	under	IBTs.		Some	water	utility	professionals	may	imagine	that	they	are	in	Case	4	
where	IBT	tariffs	target	subsidies	to	households	in	the	poor	quintiles	most	effectively,	but	we	
consider	this	unlikely	on	two	counts:	1)	few	utilities	are	actually	recovering	100%	of	full	costs;	
and	2)	there	is	no	evidence	that	the	correlation	between	household	income	and	water	use	is	this	
high.	
5.7.	Summary	of	results		
Tables	7	and	8	summarize	our	results,	comparing	each	of	the	nine	IBT	designs	in	terms	of	our	
two	criteria,	for	two	cost	recovery	constraints	(50%	and	100%)	and	the	two	assumed	
correlations	between	household	income	and	water	use.	As	shown	in	Table	7,	if	the	correlation	
between	household	income	and	water	use	is	low,	subsidies	are	always	poorly	targeted,	
regardless	of	the	level	of	cost	recovery,	the	size	of	the	lifeline	block,	or	the	size	of	the	fixed	
charge.	With	a	low	level	of	cost	recovery	(50%),	the	magnitude	of	the	subsidy	to	households	in	
the	poorest	quintile	is	substantial	(about	US$50	per	household	per	month),	but	relatively	
insensitive	to	changes	in	the	IBT	design.	Increasing	the	size	of	the	fixed	charge	makes	the	
targeting	of	subsidies	to	poor	households	slightly	worse	because	it	increases	the	average	price	
of	water	to	households	with	low	water	use	(Figure	2).	With	50%	cost	recovery,	societal	
efficiency	losses	are	relatively	low	(about	US$4‐5	per	household	per	month)	because	the	
assumption	that	households	respond	to	average	prices	keeps	the	price	distortion	modest.	
Increasing	cost	recovery	to	100%	reduces	the	magnitude	of	the	average	subsidy	to	poor	
households	(to	about	US$3‐13	per	household	depending	on	the	tariff	design),	and	does	not	
improve	the	targeting	of	subsidies	to	poor	households.	Increasing	cost	recovery	to	100%	does	
essentially	eliminate	the	societal	efficiency	losses.	Increasing	the	fixed	charge	and	reducing	the	
size	of	the	lifeline	block	raise	average	prices	at	low	levels	of	water	use	and	further	reduce	
economic	efficiency	losses.	
None	of	the	tariff	designs	presented	in	Table	7	accomplish	the	equity	objective	of	targeting	the	
majority	of	subsidies	to	poor	households.	Efficiency	losses	are	modest	with	50%	cost	recovery	
and	insignificant	with	100%	cost	recovery	if	households	respond	to	average	prices.	Increasing	
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the	cost	recovery	target	(from	50%	to	100%)	reduces	the	subsidy	to	poor	(and	rich)	households	
but	also	reduces	the	burden	on	taxpayers.	Importantly,	with	a	low	correlation	between	
household	water	use	and	income,	none	of	the	IBT	designs	improve	upon	a	simple,	transparent	
volumetric	tariff	structure	in	terms	of	any	of	the	three	objectives.	
Table	8	summarizes	the	results	for	the	case	where	the	correlation	between	household	income	
and	water	use	is	high.	The	targeting	of	subsidies	to	poor	households	is	improved	for	a	100%	
cost	recovery	target	(poor	households	receive	39%	of	total	subsidies),	but	only	if	there	is	no	
fixed	charge	and	if	the	lifeline	block	is	small.	In	these	results,	the	effect	of	adding	a	fixed	charge	
falls	heavily	on	poor	households,	reducing	both	the	percentage	of	subsidies	and	the	magnitude	
of	the	subsidy	received	by	poor	households.	Economic	efficiency	losses	are	similar	to	those	in	
Table	7	(about	US$4‐5	per	household	per	month	for	a	50%	cost	recovery	target,	and	minimal	
for	a	100%	cost	recovery	target).		
	
6.	Model	Extensions	
There	are	numerous	directions	in	which	our	calculations	could	be	extended.	Perhaps	the	three	
most	important	are:	1)	to	explore	the	implications	of	changing	our	assumption	that	households	
respond	to	marginal	instead	of	average	prices;	2)	to	explore	the	implications	of	our	assumption	
that	the	utility	operates	under	constant	returns	to	scale;	and	3)	to	report	the	performance	of	the	
alternative	tariff	structures	for	additional	criteria,	such	as	water	conservation.		
6.1.	What	happens	if	households	respond	to	marginal	instead	of	average	prices?	
The	question	of	whether	customers	respond	to	the	average	or	marginal	price	depends	on	how	
familiar	customers	are	with	the	tariff	structure	and	how	they	interpret	changes	in	their	water	
bill.	It	seems	likely	that	most	customers	are	not	familiar	with	the	specific	prices	and	charges	
embedded	in	their	water	tariff.	Also,	they	probably	do	not	routinely	monitor	their	water	use	and	
are	largely	unaware	of	the	amount	of	water	they	use	for	different	purposes.	How	then	do	they	
interpret	the	price	signal	they	receive	from	their	water	bill?	One	possibility	is	that	they	do	a	
static	analysis	and	simply	divide	their	monthly	water	bill	by	the	amount	of	water	they	use	to	
calculate	the	average	price	they	pay	per	cubic	meter.	Then	they	respond	to	this	average	price	to	
determine	the	amount	of	water	they	use	the	following	month.	
A	second	possibility	is	that	they	respond	to	the	change	in	their	current	monthly	water	bill	from	
their	previous	water	bill.	They	might	divide	the	change	in	their	water	bill	by	their	estimate	of	
the	change	in	the	quantity	of	water	they	used.	Except	for	water	use	that	occurs	near	the	
transitions	of	an	IBT,	this	price	signal	approximates	the	customer’s	marginal	price.		
All	36	scenarios	have	been	run	under	the	assumption	that	households	react	to	changes	in	
marginal	price	instead	of	the	average	price.	If	households	respond	to	marginal	prices	instead	of	
average	prices,	the	methodology	described	in	Section	4.3.	can	be	applied	with	P1		the	(marginal)	
price	of	the	block	in	which	the	household’s	water	use	falls,	but	the	calculation	of	the	change	in	
surplus	needs	to	be	adjusted.	As	shown	in	Figures	5a‐d,	we	need	to	account	for	the	payment	of	
the	fixed	charge	by	all	households	and,	for	those	households	falling	in	the	upper	block,	we	need	
to	include	in	the	calculation	the	benefit	of	getting	the	units	included	in	the	lower	block	at	a	
lower	price.		
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The	full	set	of	results	is	shown	in	Tables	9	and	10.	We	find	that	the	percentage	of	subsidies	
received	by	households	in	the	poorest	quintile,	the	average	subsidy	per	household,	and	the	
deadweight	loss	are	similar	to	the	scenarios	presented	in	Tables	7	and	8	in	which	households	
respond	to	average	prices.		
Under	the	100%	cost	recovery	assumption,	the	deadweight	loss	is	small,	in	the	range	US$0‐2	
per	household,	and	the	following	relationships	hold	whether	households	respond	to	average	or	
marginal	prices:	i)	for	a	given	lifeline	block,	an	increase	in	the	fixed	charge	always	decreases	
deadweight	loss;	and	ii)	for	a	given	fixed	charge,	an	increase	in	the	size	of	the	lifeline	block	
always	increases	the	deadweight	loss.	Thus,	in	the	100%	cost	recovery	case,	a	large	fixed	charge	
combined	to	a	small	lifeline	block	produces	the	smallest	deadweight	loss.	This	is	because	a	
small	lifeline	block	and	a	large	fixed	charge	produce	an	average	price	and	a	marginal	price	that	
are	quite	close	to	the	UP	tariff	of	US$5	per	m3.	Figure	6	provides	a	graphic	illustration	under	a	
100%	cost	recovery	assumption:	SC1	is	the	IBT‐0‐10	(US$0	fixed	charge	and	10m3	lifeline	
block)	while	SC15	is	the	IBT‐15‐5	(US$15	fixed	charge	and	5m3	lifeline	block).	Both	the	average	
and	marginal	prices	under	the	IBT‐15‐5	are	close	to	US$5	so	the	change	in	prices	when	moving	
from	UP	to	IBT	is	very	small	and	hence	the	loss	in	welfare	is	small.	However,	this	is	the	worst	
scenario	for	households	in	the	poorest	quintile	because	they	receive	the	lowest	proportion	of	
subsidies	under	this	particular	tariff	structure	(15%	of	the	total	subsidies	under	a	+0.1	
correlation	between	water	use	and	income,	and	less	than	1%	of	the	total	subsidies	under	a	+0.8	
correlation).	
Under	the	50%	cost	recovery	assumption,	the	average	deadweight	loss	varies	from	US$3	to	
US$6	per	household	under	the	assumption	that	households	respond	to	marginal	prices,	with	
larger	deadweight	losses	occurring	with	a	US$15	fixed	charge.	The	deadweight	loss	was	around	
US$4.5	per	household	for	all	scenarios	when	households	were	assumed	to	respond	to	average	
prices.	
6.2.		Does	the	utility	operate	under	constant	returns	to	scale?	
If	the	utility	operated	under	increasing	returns	to	scale,	then	the	average	cost	of	production	
would	be	higher	than	the	marginal	cost.	For	example,	if	we	assumed	that	the	marginal	cost	is	
still	US$5	per	m3	but	that	the	average	cost	is	a	specified	amount	above	that,	this	would	have	
implications	on	the	calculation	of	the	subsidies	distributed	to	each	quintile	(but	not	on	the	
proportion	of	total	subsidies	received	by	each	quintile).	The	calculation	of	the	deadweight	loss	
would	be	unchanged.		
One	could	refine	the	calculations	further	by	specifying	a	cost	function	that	describes	the	
relationship	between	the	cost	and	the	quantity	of	water	produced	more	precisely.	One	would	
then	adjust	the	marginal	cost	and	average	cost	depending	on	the	total	amount	of	water	
produced.		
6.3.		Are	additional	criteria	needed?	
Another	extension	of	our	modeling	would	be	to	add	criteria.	An	obvious	candidate	for	non‐
economists	would	be	“water	conservation.”	This	would	require	reporting	the	total	water	use	
under	the	different	scenarios.	The	total	water	use	varies	across	scenarios	because	the	price	
elasticity	of	demand	is	assumed	to	be	negative.	For	example,	under	the	reference	(UP)	case,	the	
total	water	sold	to	the	5000	households	amounts	to	about	115,000	m3.	Scenarios	with	IBTs	with	
a	zero	fixed	charge	under	100%	cost	recovery	assumption	have	the	largest	differences	in	total	
water	use	compared	to	the	reference	case	(about	15%	lower).	
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7.		Discussion	
More	careful	modeling	of	the	consequences	of	water	tariff	reforms	is	needed	to	counter	the	
global	conventional	wisdom	that	IBTs	are	a	sound,	effective	approach	for	balancing	financial	
self‐sufficiency,	equity,	and	economic	efficiency	criteria.	The	results	presented	in	this	paper	
show	that	for	a	given	level	of	cost	recovery,	IBTs	can	lead	to	societal	losses	while	doing	little	to	
increase	equity.	Our	results	also	suggest	that	the	trade‐offs	between	the	criteria	of	equity	and	
economic	efficiency	in	the	design	of	water	tariffs	are	different	to	those	generally	assumed	by	
water	utility	managers	and	policy	makers.	Water	tariff	consultants	spend	much	time	and	effort	
tinkering	with	the	details	of	new	IBT	designs	without	recognizing	how	little	such	changes	
matter	to	the	effective	targeting	of	subsidies	to	poor	households	in	most	circumstances.	These	
findings	hold	whether	households	respond	to	the	average	or	the	marginal	price.	
In	the	past	poorly	performing	water	tariffs	have	not	been	perceived	to	be	a	large	societal	
problem,	but	this	is	changing	with	growing	water	scarcity	and	climate	change.	Our	results	show	
how	the	performance	of	alternative	tariff	designs	depends	on	a	set	of	assumptions	that	require	
empirical	verification	in	a	specific	local	setting.	We	emphasize	that	the	generalizability	of	our	
findings	to	specific	utilities	in	both	industrialized	and	developing	countries	depends	on	the	
analyst	finding	estimates	of	the	parameters	used	in	the	simulation	model	that	can	accurately	
portray	local	conditions.	It	is	especially	important	to	obtain	accurate	estimates	of	the	
correlation	between	household	water	use	and	income,	the	relationship	between	average	and	
marginal	costs,	the	price	(average	or	marginal)	to	which	households	are	responding,	and	the	
target	level	of	cost	recovery.	
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Table	1	‐	Empirical	evidence	on	the	correlation	between	water	use	and	income	
Location	 Study	in	which	dataset	is	described	
Sample	
size	
Spearman's	 	
OECD	countries	 	 	
Australia	 Grafton	et	al.	(2011) 154 0.12	(n.s.)	
Canada	 Grafton	et	al.	(2011) 47 0.27	
France	 Grafton	et	al.	(2011) 326 0.15	
Italy	 Grafton	et	al.	(2011) 249 ‐0.05	(n.s.)	
Korea		 Grafton	et	al.	(2011) 109 ‐0.10	(n.s.)	
Netherlands		 Grafton	et	al.	(2011) 191 0.12	
Norway	 Grafton	et	al.	(2011) 57 0.32	
Portugal	 Correia	et	al.	(2015) 1575 0.18	
Sweden	 Grafton	et	al.	(2011) 88 0.05	(n.s.)	
	 	 	
Developing	countries	 	
Sri	Lanka	(3	cities)	 Nauges	and	van	den	Berg	(2009) 590 0.28	
El	Salvador	(3	cities)	 Strand	and	Walker	(2003) 398 0.13	
Dakar,	Senegal	 Briand	et	al.	(2010) 112 0.24	
Nairobi,	Kenya	 Fuente	et	al.	(2015) 648 0.34	
Note:	n.s.	=	non‐significant	at	95%.		
	
	
Table	2	‐	Descriptive	statistics	on	household	water	use	and	income	(source:	2008	OECD	EPIC	
survey)	
	
Nb.	of	obs.	 Mean	
water	use	
Median	
water	use	
Mean	
income	
	 	 (m3/month)	 (m3/month) (US$/month)	
Canada	 52	 41	 16	 4746	
Netherlands	 198	 15	 9	 3512	
France	 338	 11	 8	 3994	
Italy	 256	 34	 17	 3804	
Sweden	 91	 18	 11	 3518	
Norway	 57	 15	 12	 7199	
Australia	 163	 37	 16	 4316	
Korea	 111	 42	 18	 3051	
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Table	3	‐	Nine	alternative	IBT	tariff	designs	+	status	quo	UP	tariff	
Tariff	Code	 Type	of	tariff	 FC	 LLB	
		 		 (US$/mo.) (m3/mo.)	
UP‐0	 UP	 0	 0	
IBT‐0‐5	 IBT	 0	 5	
IBT‐0‐10	 IBT	 0	 10	
IBT‐0‐15	 IBT	 0	 15	
IBT‐10‐5	 IBT		 10	 5	
IBT‐10‐10	 IBT		 10	 10	
IBT‐10‐15	 IBT	 10	 15	
IBT‐15‐5	 IBT	 15	 5	
IBT‐15‐10	 IBT	 15	 10	
IBT‐15‐15	 IBT		 15	 15	
Notes:	UP	=	Uniform	Pricing,	IBT	=	Increasing	Block	Tariff,	FC	=fixed	charge,	LLB	=	lifeline	block	
	
Table	4	‐	Model	assumptions	
Assumptions	that	are	varied	…	 Parameter	value	
Correlation	between	household	income	and water	use +0.1,	+0.8
Percent	cost	recovery	 50%,	100%
Price	to	which	households	respond	 Average,	marginal	
Size	of	lifeline	block	 5	m3,	10	m3,	15	m3	
Size	of	fixed	charge	 0,	US$10,	US$15
	
Assumptions	that	are	not	varied	…	
All	households	have	metered,	piped	connections
Status	quo	tariff	structure	 Uniform	volumetric	tariff	with	price	
set	equal	to	marginal	cost	=	average	
cost	
Average	cost	of	water	and	wastewater	services US$5	per	m3
Price	elasticity	of	demand	 ‐0.2
Income	elasticity	 0.0
IBT	has	two	blocks	
Relationship	between	volumetric	price	in the	first	
block	(P1)	and	price	in	the	second	block	(P2)	
P1 =	½	P2
Lower	limit	on	household	water	use	 5	m3
Household	demand	function	for	water log‐log
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Table	5	–	Results	for	benchmark	case:	50%	cost	recovery;	correlation	between	water	use	and	income	=	0.1;	IBT	no	fixed	charge;	LLB=10m3/mo.	
By	income	quintile	(Q1	to	Q5)	and	in	total	 Q1	 Q2	 Q3	 Q4	 Q5	 Total	
In	total	
Total	number	of	households	 1000	 1000	 1000	 1000	 1000	 5000	
Total	water	use	(m3)	 20,060	 21,639	 22,848	 24,005	 25,867	 114,419	
Total	revenue	from	bills	(US$)	 48,717	 53,453	 57,082	 60,569	 66,223	 286,043	
Total	cost	(US$)	 100,300	 108,194	 114,240	 120,025	 129,336	 572,095	
Total	revenue	‐	total	cost	(US$)	 ‐51,583	 ‐54,741	 ‐57,158	 ‐59,456	 ‐63,113	 ‐286,051	
Total	change	in	surplus	with	respect	to	UP	(US$)	 47,249	 50,264	 52,571	 54,766	 58,263	 		 263,113	
Cost	recovery	(%)	 49	 49	 50	 50	 51	 50	
For	households	receiving	subsidies	(price	is	below	cost)	
Number	of	hh	receiving	subsidies	 1000	 1000	 1000	 1000	 1000	 5000	
Total	subsidies	distributed	(US$)	 51583	 54741	 57158	 59456	 63113	 286051	
Total	subsidies	distributed	(%)	 18	 19	 20	 21	 22	 100	
Total	change	in	surplus	with	respect	to	UP	(US$)	 47,249	 50,264	 52,571	 54,766	 58,263	 		 263,113	
Total	water	use	(m3)	 20,060	 21,639	 22,848	 24,005	 25,867	 114,419	
Total	revenue	from	bills	(US$)	 48,717	 53,453	 57,082	 60,569	 66,223	 286,043	
Average	subsidy	per	household	(US$)	 51.6	 54.7	 57.2	 59.5	 63.1	 57.2	
Average	subsidy	per	m3	(US$)	 2.6	 2.5	 2.5	 2.5	 2.4	 2.5	
Average	water	bill	per	household	(US$)	 49	 53	 57	 61	 66	 57	
Average	water	use	per	household	(m3)	 20	 22	 23	 24	 26	 23	
For	households	making	payments	(price	is	above	cost)	
Number	of	hh	making	payments		 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Total	payments	made	(US$)	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Total	payments	made	(%)	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Total	change	in	surplus	with	respect	to	UP	(US$)	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 		 0	
Total	water	use	(m3)	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Total	revenue	from	bills	(US$)	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Average	payment	per	household	(US$)	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Average	payment	per	m3	(US$)	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Average	water	bill	per	household	(US$)	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
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Table	6	–	Scenario	1:	100%	cost	recovery;	correlation	between	water	use	and	income	=	0.1;	IBT	no	fixed	charge;	LLB	=	10m3/mo.	
By	income	quintile	(Q1	to	Q5)	and	in	total	 Q1	 Q2	 Q3	 Q4	 Q5	 Total	
In	total	
Total	number	of	households	 1000	 1000	 1000	 1000	 1000	 5000	
Total	water	use	(m3)	 18,266	 19,696	 20,468	 21,712	 23,400	 103,543	
Total	revenue	from	bills	(US$)	 88,686	 97,320	 102,017	 109,670	 120,018	 517,711	
Total	cost	(US$)	 91,331	 98,480	 102,342	 108,561	 117,000	 517,714	
Total	revenue	‐	total	cost	(US$)	 ‐2645	 ‐1160	 ‐325	 1109	 3018	 ‐3	
Total	change	in	surplus	with	respect	to	UP	(US$)	 2232	 748	 ‐89	 ‐1528	 ‐3443	 		 ‐2080	
Cost	recovery	(%)	 97	 99	 100	 101	 103	 100	
For	households	receiving	subsidies	(price	is	below	cost)	
Number	of	hh	receiving	subsidies	 770	 742	 727	 703	 673	 3614	
Total	subsidies	distributed	(US$)	 8783	 8439	 8256	 7935	 7553	 40,965	
Total	subsidies	distributed	(%)	 21	 21	 20	 19	 18	 100	
Total	change	in	surplus	with	respect	to	UP	(US$)	 8459	 8133	 7960	 7653	 7290	 		 39,495	
Total	water	use	(m3)	 8414	 8354	 8309	 8188	 8043	 41,308	
Total	revenue	from	bills	(US$)	 33,287	 33,333	 33,289	 33,004	 32,663	 165,576	
Average	subsidy	per	household	(US$)	 11.4	 11.4	 11.4	 11.3	 11.2	 11.3	
Average	subsidy	per	m3	(US$)	 1.0	 1.0	 1.0	 1.0	 0.9	 1.0	
Average	water	bill	per	household	(US$)	 43	 45	 46	 47	 49	 46	
Average	water	use	per	household	(m3)	 11	 11	 11	 12	 12	 11	
For	households	making	payments	(price	is	above	cost)	
Number	of	hh	making	payments		 230	 258	 273	 297	 327	 1386	
Total	payments	made	(US$)	 6137	 7278	 7931	 9044	 10,571	 40,962	
Total	payments	made	(%)	 15	 18	 19	 22	 26	 100	
Total	change	in	surplus	with	respect	to	UP	(US$)	 ‐6227	 ‐7386	 ‐8049	 ‐9181	 ‐10,733	 		 ‐41,575	
Total	water	use	(m3)	 9852	 11,342	 12,159	 13,524	 15,357	 62,235	
Total	revenue	from	bills	(US$)	 55,399	 63,987	 68,728	 76,666	 87,355	 352,135	
Average	payment	per	household	(US$)	 26.6	 28.2	 29.1	 30.5	 32.3	 29.6	
Average	payment	per	m3	(US$)	 0.6	 0.6	 0.7	 0.7	 0.7	 0.7	
Average	water	bill	per	household	(US$)	 241	 248	 252	 258	 267	 254	
Average	water	use	per	household	(m3)	 43	 44	 45	 46	 47	 45	
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Table	7	–	Alternatives‐by‐criteria	decision	matrix	(correlation	between	household	income	and	water	use	=	+0.1);	household	responds	to	average	price 
Criteria	 IBT‐0‐5*	 IBT‐0‐10 IBT‐0‐15 IBT‐10‐5 IBT‐10‐10	 IBT‐10‐15 IBT‐15‐5 IBT‐15‐10 IBT‐15‐15	
	 	
Cost	recovery 50%	 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%	
Equity	 	
%	of	subsidies	to	
poorest	quintile	
18%	 18% 18% 17% 18% 18% 17% 17% 17%	
Average	monthly	
subsidy	in	poorest	
quintile	
US$51	 US$52 US$52 US$50 US$50	 US$50 US$49 US$49 US$49	
Economic	
efficiency	
(deadweight	loss)	
‐US$21,810	
(US$4.4/hh)	
‐US$22,938
(US$4.6/hh)
	
‐US$23,546
(US$4.7/hh)	
‐US$21,276
(US$4.3/hh)	
‐US$21,133	
(US$4.2/hh)	
‐US$21,419
(US$4.3/hh)	
‐US$22,216
(US$4.4/hh)	
‐US$21,827
(US$4.4/hh)	
	
‐US$21,903	
(US$4.4/hh)	
	 	
Cost	recovery 100%	 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%	
Equity	 	
%	of	subsidies	to	
poorest	quintile	
22%	 21% 21% 22% 21% 20% 15% 20% 19%	
Average	monthly	
subsidy	in	poorest	
quintile	
US$7	 US$11 US$13 US$2 US$5 US$9 US$3 US$5 US$8	
Economic	
efficiency	
(deadweight	loss)	
‐US$920	
(US$0.2/hh)	
‐US$2080
(US$0.4/hh)	
‐US$2596
(US$0.5/hh)	
‐US$197
(US$0.0/hh)	
‐US$519	
(US$0.1/hh)	
‐US$951
(US$0.2/hh)	
‐US$26
(US$0.0/hh)	
‐US$272
(US$0.1/hh)	
‐US$646	
(US$0.1/hh)	
*	IBT‐0‐5	stands	for	an	IBT	design	with	a	US$0	fixed	charge	and	a	5m3	lifeline	block.	
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Table	8	–	Alternatives‐by‐criteria	decision	matrix	(correlation	between	household	income	and	water	use	=	+0.8);	household	responds	to	average	price	
Criteria	 IBT‐0‐5*	 IBT‐0‐10 IBT‐0‐15 IBT‐10‐5 IBT‐10‐10 IBT‐10‐15 IBT‐15‐5 IBT‐15‐10 IBT‐15‐15	
	 	 	 	
Cost	recovery 50%	 50% 50% 50% 50%	 50% 50% 50% 50%	
Equity	 	 	 	
%	of	subsidies	to	
poorest	quintile	
8%	 9% 9% 5% 6%	 6% 4% 4% 4%	
Average	monthly	
subsidy	in	poorest	
quintile	
US$24	 US$25 US$25 US$16 US$17	 US$16 US$11 US$12 US$12	
Economic	
efficiency	
(deadweight	loss)	
‐US$21,775	
(US$4.4/hh)	
‐US$22,913
(US$4.6/hh)	
‐US$23,540
(US$4.7/hh)	
‐US$21,250
(US$4.3/hh)	
‐US$21,229
(US$4.2/hh)	
‐US$21,419
(US$4.3/hh)	
‐US$22,202
(US$4.4/hh)	
‐US$21,794
(US$4.4/hh)	
‐US$21,903	
(US$4.4/hh)	
	 	 	 	
Cost	recovery 100%	 100% 100% 100% 100%	 100% 100% 100% 100%	
Equity	 	 	 	
%	of	subsidies	to	
poorest	quintile	
39%	 28% 21% 40% 16%	 9% <1% 11% 7%	
Average	monthly	
subsidy	in	poorest	
quintile	
US$9	 US$12 US$10 US$2 US$3	 US$6 US$1 US$5 US$6	
Economic	
efficiency	
(deadweight	loss)	
‐US$870	
(US$0.2/hh)	
‐US$2102
(US$0.4/hh)	
‐US$2658
(US$0.5/hh)	
‐US$204
(US$0.0/hh)	
‐US$454
(US$0.1/hh)	
‐US$970
(US$0.2/hh)	
‐US$34
(US$0.0/hh)	
‐US$233
(US$0.0/hh)	
‐US$626	
(US$0.1/hh)	
*	IBT‐0‐5	stands	for	an	IBT	design	with	a	US$0	fixed	charge	and	a	5m3	lifeline	block.
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Table	9	–	Alternatives‐by‐criteria	decision	matrix	(correlation	between	household	income	and	water	use	=	+0.1);	household	responds	to	marginal	price	
Criteria	 IBT‐0‐5*	 IBT‐0‐10 IBT‐0‐15 IBT‐10‐5 IBT‐10‐10	 IBT‐10‐15 IBT‐15‐5 IBT‐15‐10 IBT‐15‐15
	 	
Cost	recovery	 50%	 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
Equity	 	
%	of	subsidies	to	
poorest	quintile	
18%	 18% 18% 17% 18% 18% 17% 17% 17%
Average	monthly	
subsidy	in	poorest	
quintile	
US$51	 US$51 US$51 US$50 US$51 US$51 US$50 US$51 US$50
Economic	efficiency	
(deadweight	loss)	
‐US$15,046	
(US$3.0/hh)	
‐US$14,051
(US$2.8/hh)	
‐US$13,965
(US$2.8/hh)	
‐US$25,340
(US$5.1/hh)	
‐US$23,826	
(US$4.8/hh)	
‐US$23,359
(US$4.7/hh)	
‐US$32,101
(US$6.4/hh)	
‐US$30,233
(US$6.0/hh)	
US$29,454
(US$5.9/hh)	
	 	
Cost	recovery	 100%	 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Equity	 	
%	of	subsidies	to	
poorest	quintile	
22%	 21% 21% 22% 21% 20% 15% 20% 19%
Average	monthly	
subsidy	in	poorest	
quintile	
US$7	 US$12 US$13 US$2 US$6 US$9 US$3 US$5 US$9
Economic	efficiency
(deadweight	loss)	
‐US$959	
(US$0.2/hh)	
‐US$4101
(US$0.8/hh)	
‐US$6468
(US$1.3/hh)	
‐US$168
(US$0.0/hh)	
‐US$2441	
(US$0.5/hh)	
‐US$4469
(US$0.9/hh)	
US$193
(US$0.0/hh)	
‐US$2046
(US$0.4/hh)	
‐US$3886
(US$0.8/hh)	
*	IBT‐0‐5	stands	for	an	IBT	design	with	a	US$0	fixed	charge	and	a	5m3	lifeline	block.	
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Table	10	–	Alternatives‐by‐criteria	decision	matrix	(correlation	between	household	income	and	water	use	=	+0.8);	household	responds	to	marginal	price	
Criteria	 IBT‐0‐5*	 IBT‐0‐10 IBT‐0‐15 IBT‐10‐5 IBT‐10‐10	 IBT‐10‐15 IBT‐15‐5 IBT‐15‐10 IBT‐15‐15	
	 	 	 	
Cost	recovery	 50%	 50% 50% 50% 50%	 50% 50% 50% 50%	
Equity	 	 	 	
%	of	subsidies	to	
poorest	quintile	
8%	 9% 9% 6% 6%	 6% 4% 5% 5%	
Average	subsidy	in	
poorest	quintile	
US$24	 US$25 US$25 US$16 US$18	 US$18 US$13 US$14 US$14	
Economic	efficiency	
(deadweight	loss)	
‐US$15,045	
(US$3.0/hh)	
‐US$14,051
(US$2.8/hh)	
‐US$13,973
(US$2.8/hh)	
‐US$25,331
(US$5.1/hh)	
‐US$23,823	
(US$4.8/hh)	
‐US$23,372
(US$4.7/hh)	
‐US$32,008
(US$6.4/hh)	
‐US$30,227
(US$6.0/hh)	
‐US$29,453	
(US$5.9/hh)	
	 	 	 	
Cost	recovery	 100%	 100% 100% 100% 100%	 100% 100% 100% 100%	
Equity	 	 	 	
%	of	subsidies	to	
poorest	quintile	
39%	 27% 20% 39% 18%	 9% <1% 12% 7%	
Average	subsidy	in	
poorest	quintile	
US$10	 US$11 US$10 US$2 US$4	 US$6 US$1 US$5 US$6	
Economic	efficiency	
(deadweight	loss)	
‐US$924	
(US$0.2/hh)	
‐US$4098
(US$0.8/hh)	
‐US$6488
(US$1.3/hh)	
‐US$159
(US$0.0/hh)	
‐US$2416	
(US$0.5/hh)	
‐US$4484
(US$0.9/hh)	
US$226
(US$0.0/hh)	
‐US$2067
(US$0.4/hh)	
‐US$3886	
(US$0.8/hh)	
IBT‐0‐5	stands	for	an	IBT	design	with	a	US$0	fixed	charge	and	a	5m3	lifeline	block.	
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Figure	1	‐	Average	water	price	(US$/m3)	vs.	monthly	water	use	(m3)	under	three	IBT	tariffs	with	
US$0	fixed	charge	(FC)	and	three	sizes	of	the	lifeline	block	(5m3,	10m3,	and	15m3	per	month)	
	
	
		
Figure	2	‐	Average	water	price	(US$/m3)	as	a	function	of	monthly	water	use	(m3)	under	three	
IBT	tariffs	with	non‐zero	fixed	charge	(FC)	and	two	sizes	of	the	lifeline	block	(LLB):	5m3	and	
10m3	per	month		
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Figure	3	–	Distribution	of	subsidies	across	quintiles	(Q1	to	Q5)	under	four	different	scenarios	(IBT	with	US$0	fixed	charge	and	10m3	lifeline	block)	
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Figure	4	–	Cumulative	distribution	of	subsidies	vs.	household	income	percentile;	two	levels	of	
cost	recovery	(50%,	100%)	and	two	levels	of	correlation	(+0.1,	+0.8)	
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5a‐d	–	Calculating	the	consumer	su
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rplus	of	a	shift	from	UP	to	IBT	tariff	(4	cases)	
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Figure	6	‐	Average	and	marginal	prices	under	IBT‐0‐10	(US$0	fixed	charge	and	10m3	lifeline	
block)	and	IBT‐15‐5	(US$15	fixed	charge	and	5m3	lifeline	block),	100%	cost	recovery	
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